Dr. phil. Promotion an der University of Warwick (England) 2004 unter der Leitung von Stephen Houlgate. 2005-2006 Research Fellow bei dem Instituto de Investigacionas Filosóficas in Mexico City. 2006-2011 Assistant Professor an der Universität von Amsterdam. Letzten Oktober hat er eine Monographie über Kant's Deduction and Apperception bei Palgrave Macmillan (2012) veröffentlicht. Weitere Schriften über das Thema des Kolloquiums: – Transcendental Apperception and Consciousness in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics, in: Reading Kant's Lectures, hrsg. V. R. Clewis, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter (vsl. 2015); – Kant, Non-Conceptual Content, and the “Second Step” of the B-Deduction, in: Kant Studies Online (2012): 51–92 (überarbeitete Fassung von Kant, non-conceptuele inhoud en synthese, in: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 679-715); – Non-Apperceptive Consciousness, in: P. Giordanetti, R. Pozzo und M. Sgarbi (Hrsg.), Kant´s Philosophy of the Unconscious, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter (2012): 271-302; – On Strawson on Kantian Apperception, in: South African Journal of Philosophy 27, 3 (2008): 257–71; – Probleme des 'kantianischen' Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion, in: Kant-Studien (im Erscheinen); – Kant's Deduction From Apperception: Reply to My Critics, Buchsymposium zu Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories (Kommentatoren: Corey Dyck, Marcel Quarfood, Andrew Stephenson), in: Studi kantiani (im Erscheinen).
In my paper I address the problem, raised in some Anglophone Kant literature (Van Cleve 1999; Gomes 2010; Stephenson 2015) and going back to Stroud (1968), of an alleged "gap" in Kant's argument in TD for the necessary application of the categories to objects of experience, and show that it is based on a misunderstanding about the principle of the unity of apperception and its inherent objective validity.
The putative gap is construed in terms of the difference between arguing that we must apply categories in order to be able to think of, experience, or perceive objects and arguing that the categories must so apply. Put in more general terms: The truth of our conceptual scheme does not necessarily imply the truth about objects. The claim here is that Kant argues for the necessary conditions of our conceptual scheme only, but fails to show that the categories are actually exemplified by the objects of our experience.
I want to confront this conundrum by focusing on another, more conventionally Kantian, construal of a putative gap in Kant's argument, which has been noted by Carl (1989), Guyer (1992), Mohr (1991) and Pereboom (2001). This concerns the gap between the argument for the subjective principle of transcendental apperception as a principle of self-consciousness and the argument regarding the objective unity of apperception. Presumably, so these authors claim, Kant illicitly moves directly from the transcendental unity of apperception as a subjective principle (argued in §16 of the B-Deduction) to the objective unity of apperception as a principle of objective experience (argued in §§17 and 18 of the B-Deduction). I contend that a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the analytic principle of apperception and the notion of objective validity, and what this entails for the concept of objectivity, underlies this criticism of a gap in Kant's argument, in both aforementioned construals. Contrary to Van Cleve et al., I argue that showing that the categories necessarily apply to objects is entailed by showing that the categories are necessarily instantiated in the experience of objects; but, equally, contrary to Carl et al., that it can be shown that the subjective conditions governing self-consciousness are in fact the objective conditions that govern experience of objects, once the analytic principle of apperception is properly interpreted.