Camilla Serck-Hanssen
Prof. Dr. Promotion (Ph.D.) im Jahr 1996 an der University of California in San Diego (Transcendental Apperception: A Study in Kant´s Theoretical Philosophy and Idealism). Camilla Sherk-Hanssen ist Professorin an der Universität in Oslo. Sie hat mehrere Aufsätze über Kant veröffentlicht, welche zum Teil in engem Verhältnis zu den Themen der Konferenz stehen. Man beachte vor allem: – Der Nutzen von Illusionen. Ist die Idee der Seele unentbehrlich?, in: Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Die regulative Ideen in Kants theoretische Philosophie, Hildesheim: Olms (2011): 59-71; – Deflationary Idealism and Kantian Subjectivity, in: Anita Leirfall und Thor Sandmel (Hrsg.), Enhet i mangfold. Festskrift i anledning Johan Arnt Myrstads 60-årsdag, Unipub forlag, (2009): 431-446; – Kant on Consciousness, in: Sara Heinämaa (Hrsg.), Psychology and Philosophy, Springer (2009): 139-157; – Kant on the human standpoint, in: Theoria 74 (2008): 79-85; – Apperception and Deduction in the Duisburgischer Nachlass, in: V. Gerhardt, R. Horstmann und R. Schumacher (Hrsg.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, vol. 2, Berlin: de Gruyter (2001): 59-69.
Fighting Achilles - Why the Unity of Apperception does not imply Simplicity
Abstract
In this talk I shall argue that Kant's distinction between two kinds of negation, viz. that of negative and infinite judgment, provides a powerful tool for dismissing the Achilles argument. The crucial difference between these two kinds of negation is that infinite judgment has existential import, while negative judgment does not. My aim is to show that the dialectical inference of the second paralogism not only equivocates the two kinds of negation, but that it illicitly helps itself to the use of infinite judgment, and hence to an existence assumption as far as the soul goes. By this move, the argument appears to be able to draw a metaphysical conclusion about the thinking I: that it exists as a simple substance. However, the only warranted conclusion is that it is a logically simple subject.